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Why firms exist

Why firms exist

The Economist's explainer on Coase's theory of the firm opens with the economist Paul Seabright and a shirt. It was made through global markets, and nobody was in charge of the whole chain. Nobody told the cotton grower what to send to the mill, or the mill what to send to the sewing room. Prices and contracts passed the work along. That raises an obvious question: if markets can do all that, why do firms exist at all?

Ronald Coase asked that question in 1937, in a short paper called "The Nature of the Firm." His answer was that using a market costs something. You have to find a supplier, agree on a price, write the contract, and check that the work was done. Economists call these transaction costs. When they get high enough, it is cheaper to stop negotiating and direct the work instead. That is what a firm does.

Take an employee. He agrees to follow a range of instructions for a fixed salary, and nobody negotiates a separate deal for each task. The employer says do this, and it gets done. The firm replaces a string of small contracts with one standing arrangement, and sometimes that is simply cheaper.

Coase came back to the problem in 1960 with "The Problem of Social Cost." If property rights are well defined and transaction costs are low, he argued, private bargaining can settle problems like pollution without anyone having to step in. He won the Nobel in 1991.

Coase was not happy with how the idea was used. In 1972 he said the paper had become "much cited and little used." Transaction costs turned into a catch-all, a phrase that closed off questions instead of opening them.

The harder questions came next. If firms cut transaction costs, why not let one firm grow to cover everything? Why have markets at all? Much of the later work asks how to write contracts that cannot cover every case. A spot market polices itself: you buy a newspaper or hail a taxi, and the deal is finished. A deal that locks both sides in, like a property lease, needs a long contract. Employment is different. Its contracts are incomplete by nature, and they hold together because of trust. Oliver Williamson, who shared the Nobel in 2009, described the firm as a "mini-society." Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, who shared the 2016 prize for their work on incomplete contracts, built on that idea.

Other economists looked at ownership. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz saw the firm as a central contractor and monitor for team production, where output cannot be traced back to each person. Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart argued that ownership matters because it gives the owner the rights over whatever a contract leaves unsaid. Buying a supplier gives you those rights, but you lose the supplier's drive to innovate and control costs. So the answer depends on the job. A car insurance agent's renewals depend on her own effort, so she should own the client list. For life insurance, a merger may make more sense, because the firm adds more value. Franchises keep the profit and pay a royalty.

Pay matters too. Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom argued in 1991 that when a task is hard to monitor, strong incentives tied to one measure can backfire. That is why a teacher may end up teaching to the test, and why a chief executive may chase the share price. Fixed salaries, and deferred pay like pensions and seniority, bind people to the firm over the long run.

Does the gig economy make all this obsolete? The Economist does not think so. Platforms like Uber blur the edges of the firm —but flexibility comes at a cost— and the firm does not wither. Flexibility discourages the investment in firm-specific skills, and complex products such as the iPhone or the A380 depend on long-term, incomplete contracts. The article ends where Coase would have liked: successful economies need both the benign dictatorship of the firm and the invisible hand of the market.

If you want to go further, start with Coase's 1937 paper. It is short, and it still asks the right first question.

Sources

Coase's theory of the firm, The Economist, Jul 27th 2017, https://www.ius.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:e16c6e99-19d2-42c4-8bd7-cfb94a79b54e/The%20Economist_Coase%20Theory%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf

1The Economist, Economics brief, "Coase call" (July 27, 2017).

2Ronald Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937). Coase's answer: firms form because the cost of using the market is high.

3Coase (1937) on the employee who agrees to follow varied instructions for a fixed salary.

4Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960). Coase received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991.

5Ronald Coase, 1972, as quoted in The Economist, "Coase call" (July 27, 2017).

6Oliver Williamson, Nobel Prize in Economics, 2009; Williamson's description of the firm as a "mini-society" as reported in The Economist. Hart and Holmström shared the 2016 Nobel for work on contract theory.

7Alchian and Demsetz (1972) on the firm as central contractor and monitor of team production; Grossman and Hart (1986) on specific and residual rights of ownership.

8Holmström and Milgrom (1991) on multitask incentives, as reported in The Economist, "Coase call" (July 27, 2017).

9The Economist, "Coase call" (July 27, 2017), on the gig economy and the conclusion that economies need both the firm and the market.